Location-based Behavioral Authentication Using GPS Distance Coherence by Thao, Tran Phuong
Location-based Behavioral Authentication Using
GPS Distance Coherence
Tran Phuong Thao
University of Tokyo, Japan
Graduate School of Information Science and Technology
tpthao@yamagula.ic.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp
yamaguchi.rie@i.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Abstract. Most of the current user authentication systems are based
on PIN code, password, or biometrics traits which can have some limi-
tations in usage and security. Lifestyle authentication has become a new
research approach. A promising idea for it is to use the location history
since it is relatively unique. Even when people are living in the same area
or have occasional travel, it does not vary from day to day. For Global
Positioning System (GPS) data, the previous work used the longitude,
the latitude, and the timestamp as the features for the classification. In
this paper, we investigate a new approach utilizing the distance coher-
ence which can be extracted from the GPS itself without the need to
require other information. We applied three ensemble classification Ran-
domForest, ExtraTrees, and Bagging algorithms; and the experimental
result showed that the approach can achieve 99.42%, 99.12%, and 99.25%
of accuracy, respectively.
Keywords: Smartphone Location-based Authentication, Lifestyle Au-
thentication, Global Positioning System (GPS), Biometrics Authentica-
tion
1 Introduction
The term Society 5.0 [4] has become a well-known buzzword which was intro-
duced by the Japanese government in 20111. Society 5.0 is used to refer to a
super-smart society that balances economic advancement with the resolution
of social problems. Society 5.0 focuses on two important keywords human-
centered and smart life with the support of Artificial Intelligent (AI), Internet
of Things (IoT), big data, and cutting-edge technologies.
Let’s consider an example of the electronic payment system. In 1871, Western
Union debuted the electronic fund transfer (EFT) which allows people to send
money to pay for goods and services without necessarily having to be physically
present at the point-of-sale. In 1946, John Biggins was the inventor of the first
1 Society 5.0 follows Society 1.0 (the hunting society), Society 2.0 (agricultural soci-
ety), Society 3.0 (industrial society), and Society 4.0 (information society
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bank-issued credit card which can be used to replace paper money (although the
concept of using a card for purchases and the term credit card was described
in 1887 by Edward Bellamy). In 2011, Google was the first company to launch
a project of mobile wallet which can be used to replace physical cash and even
credit cards. Nowadays, the cashless payment system has become a recent trend.
Many digital wallet services appeared such as Apple Pay (from 2014), Google
Pay (from 2015 as Android Pay and from 2018 as Google Pay), Rakuten Pay
(from 2016), etc.
The biggest challenge for such payment systems is how to authenticate (ver-
ify) the users. The current approach is to rely on the authentication of the
mobile phones using PIN code, password, biometrics information (i.e., finger-
printing, iris, face, etc.), or multi-factor method which combines more than one
method of authentication from independent categories of credentials.
Attacks and Vulnerabilities in Current Smartphone Authentication
Gradually, there appeared many sophisticated attacks in smartphone authen-
tication. First, PIN code/ password-guessing attack [15, 16] tries to recover the
password plaintext from its hashed form using brute force attack which system-
atically checks every combination of letters, symbols, numbers and dictionary
attack which uses a dictionary of common words. Second, biometric spoofing
tries to generate synthetic or fake biometric traits of legal users to fool the cap-
ture sensors including facial spoofing which utilizes printed facial photographs
and digital video [21] or a 3D mask [22], fingerprinting spoofing [23] which uti-
lizes artificial replicas with different materials such as gelatin, latex, play-doh
or silicone, and iris spoofing [17] which utilizes an image forging natural iridal
texture characteristics [18] or even cosmetic contact lenses [19,20], and the com-
bination of all these three spoofing types [24]. Third, smudge attack tries to guess
the graphical password pattern in touch screen phones by analyzing the epider-
mal oils and smears left on the device’s screen by the user’s fingers [25]. Fourth,
shoulder-surfing attack [26] uses social engineering techniques to steal the vic-
tim’s personal information such as PIN code and password by looking over the
victim’s shoulder or by eavesdropping sensitive information being spoken and
heard or keystrokes on a device.
Furthermore, not related to any attack, several studies found that a large
number of users themselves do not lock their smartphones. An analysis of over
150 smartphone users was conducted in [11] and showed that 33% of the users
do not use any screen lock even PIN, password, or pattern. Face-to-face quali-
tative interviews with 28 participants were conducted in [12]. 29% of the users
responded that they did not lock their devices. The three most common reasons
include: emergency personnel not being able to identify them, not having the
devices returned if lost, and not believing they worth data. An online survey
with 260 participants and a field study with 52 participants was performed to
analyze smartphone users’ risk perception and behaviors [13]. They showed that
40.9% of users use slide-to-unlock and 16.2% of users do not use any screen lock.
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Location-based Behavioral Authentication Toward the construction of a
smarter and securer mobile-based authentication system, there are several ques-
tions. First, for mitigating the aforementioned attacks, is there an additional
mobile-based authentication method that can support the conventional methods
such as using PIN code, password, and human biometric traits (i.e., fingerprints,
face, iris)? Second, imaging the scenario that a person is on the way going to a
coffee shop. Before the person arrives, the coffee shop can predict that he/she will
arrive 15 minutes later with a high probability, and prepares in advance his/her
usual order, and will automatically subtract the charge from his account. The
person then does not need to wait time for the order and payment process. So,
the question is: is it possible to authenticate and predict the location (for ex-
ample, the coffee shop) that the users are likely going to? Last but not least, in
the recent situation of the COVID-19 pandemic, the current smartphone-based
cashless payment can reduce the chance of using cash or card, but still, the
user needs to touch the smartphone screen to show the bar code to the cashier.
The final question is that is it possible if the user can pay for goods when only
bringing the smartphone without the need to touch the screen?
An idea that can answer these questions is using behavioral (or habit)-based
information. It is a new research topic in which the main challenge is how to
decide good behavioral information for authentication. Inspirited from L. Frid-
man (MIT) et al. [5] just in 2016, GPS location history is the most promising
approach because “It is relatively unique to each individual even for people liv-
ing in the same area of a city. Also, outside of occasional travel, it does not vary
significantly from day to day. Human beings are creatures of habit, and in as
much as location is a measure of habit”. At this time, it can only say that single
behavioral authentication is an additional method to support the conventional
methods (i.e., password, PIN code, biometrics) or a method to be combined
with other behavioral factors. In the future, if a payment system can be con-
structed such that the users do not need to bring anything even small wearable
devices such as smartwatches or RFID chips (e.g., the data can be collected via
satellite sensors) and which can completely replace the conventional biometrics
authentication, it is a step closer to Society 5.0.
Motivation A system that can achieve a high authentication accuracy is when
it can collect multiple factors as much as possible. However, from the users’
viewpoint, the most convenient system that does not bring strong privacy con-
cerns to the users is when it does not require the users to provide too much
information. From the GPS records, most of the previous work utilized the lon-
gitude, the latitude, and the information extracted from the timestamp (i.e.,
year, month, day, hour, minute, second, day of the week, etc.) as the features in
the classification machine learning model for the user authentication. Given lim-
ited information from the GPS (longitude, latitude, and timestamp), if metadata
that carries extra independent information can be obtained from the GPS itself,
it can help to improve the accuracy. An example of GPS-based self-enhancement
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comes from [7] in which the address is extracted from the pair of longitude and
latitude using a reverse geocoding.
Contribution In this paper, we propose an idea of extracting the distance co-
herence features from the GPS records themselves without the need to request
any other information besides the GPS. For each user, the locations at close time
clocks may have some closer correlation in physical distance than the locations at
far time clocks since a human needs a period of time to gradually move from a lo-
cation to another location. Since the idea actually reflects a movement “lifestyle”
of the users, we hypothesized that it may improve the accuracy. Although it may
be not 100% correct when the user goes forward and then backward within the
considered period of time, the proposed distance coherence features are used as
the additional features to support the previous features.
To evaluate how feasible the approach is, we collected 107,637 GPS records
from 348 users. We applied three ensemble machine learning classification (Ran-
domForest, ExtraTrees, and Bagging) on a total of 13 features including the
distance coherences features. The experimental result showed that our approach
outperforms the approach without the distance coherence features with the ac-
curacy of 99.42% (for RandomForest), 99.12% (for ExtraTrees), 99.25% (for
Bagging) and merely 0% of false positive rate and 0.01% of false negative rate
(for all the three algorithms).
Considering it reasonability, it may raise the discussion that since the distance
coherence score can be inferred from the GPS and the timestamp, so whether
the entropy of the distance coherence is the same as that of the GPS and the
timestamp, or in other words, whether the distance coherence gives no additional
information to the GPS and the timestamp. However, for each sample, the cor-
responding distance coherence is computed from not just the sample but also
other samples that have a close timestamp with the considered sample. There-
fore, the GPS, the timestamp, and the distance coherence score are independent
variables. Furthermore, of course the model using GPS and timestamp can be
improved if they are combined with other factors such as Wifi information, web
browser log, etc. However, the goal in this paper is to make clear whether the
distance coherence score extracted from the GPS and the timestamp can be
helpful for the better classification model. We thus excluded other factors to
make the comparison clean.
Roadmap The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related work is
introduced in Section 2. The proposed method is described in Section 3. The
experiment is presented in Section 4. The threat model is presented in Section 5.
The discussion about future work is shown in Section 6. Finally, the conclusion
is drawn in Section 7.
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2 Related Work
In this section, we present related work focusing on multimodal authentication
using human-smartphone interactions and using other factors. The term multi-
modal (not multimodel) is used to indicate the biometrics authentication using
multiple biometric data. It is opposite with unimodal which uses only a single
biometric data.
2.1 Multimodal Authentication for Smartphone
L. Fridman et al. [5] analyzed the behavioral data of four modalities from active
mobile devices including text stylometry typed on a soft keyboard, application
usage patterns, web browsing behavior, and physical location of the device from
GPS (outdoor) and Wifi (indoor). The data was collected from 200 users in more
than 30 days. The authors proposed a parallel binary decision-level fusion archi-
tecture for classifiers based on four biometric modalities. A. Alejandro et al. [8]
performed an analysis on a multimodal data consisting of four biometric data
channels (including touch gestures, keystroking, accelerometer, and gyroscope)
and three behavior profiling (including WiFi, GPS location and app usage). The
data was obtained during the natural human-smartphone interaction of 48 users
on average 10 days per user. They proposed two authentication models named
the one-time approach that uses all the channel information available during
one session, and an active approach that uses behavioral data from multiple
sessions by updating a confidence score. W. Shi et al. [6] proposed an authenti-
cation framework that enables continuous and implicit user identification service
for a smartphone. The data was collected from four sensor modalities including
voice, GPS location, multitouch, and locomotion. They conducted a preliminary
empirical study with a small set of users (seven). The result showed that the
four modalities are enough for mobile user identification. R. Valentin et al. [10]
conducted an analysis on multimodal sensing modalities with mobile devices
when the GPS, accelerometer, and audio signals are utilized for human recog-
nition. The data was collected from four existing datasets which consist of 491
users. They applied four variants of deep learning for interpreting user activity
and context as captured by multi-sensor systems. M. Upal et al. [14] investi-
gated user authentication methods using the first non-commercial multimodal
data which focuses on three smartphone sensors (front camera, touch sensor,
and location service). The data was collected from 48 users for 2 months. Their
benchmark results for face detection, face verification, touch-based user iden-
tification, and location-based next place prediction showed that more robust
methods fine-tuned to the mobile platform are needed to achieve satisfactory
verification accuracy. T. Thao et al. [7] extracted the addresses given the lon-
gitudes and latitudes from the GPS records and then applied the text mining
on the addresses. The data was collected from 50 users for about four months.
Their experimental result showed that the combination between the text fea-
tures and the GPS data can improve the classification accuracy. B. Aaron et
al. [9] proposed a wallet repository that can store biometric data using multiple
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layers: biometric layer, a genomic layer, a health layer, a privacy layer, and a
processing layer. The processing layer can be used to determine and track the
user location, the speed when the user is moving using GPS data.
2.2 Other Multimodal Authentication
Besides using human-smartphone interactions, multimodal authentication also
uses other factors. T. Kaczmarek et al. [27] investigated a new hybrid biometric
based on a human users seated posture pattern in an average office chair over
the course of a typical workday. Their experimental results on a population of 30
users showed that the posture pattern biometric can capture a unique combina-
tion of physiological and behavioral traits and can authenticate the users with
91% of accuracy. M. Ivan et al. [28] proposed an approach which combines the
PIN code and the pulse-response. For the experiment process, the biometric in-
formation from 10 users was collected. The result showed that each human body
exhibits a unique response to a signal pulse applied at the palm of one hand, and
measured at the palm of the other. The experimental result for user authentica-
tion achieved 88% of accuracy when the records are taken weeks apart. W. Louis
et al. [31] and R. Alejandro et al. [33] constructed a continuous authentication
system based on electrocardiogram (ECG) and electroencephalogram (EEG).
Their approaches achieved 1.57% and 0.82% of false negative rate, respectively.
E. Simon et al. [30] extracted distinct patterns from eye movement (it is dif-
ferent from iris) with 21 features that can be used for user authentication. The
data was collected from 30 users in 2 weeks with 3 scenarios (no prior knowl-
edge, the knowledge gained through a description, and knowledge gain through
observation). The experimental result achieved 3.98% of equal error rate.
3 Proposed Approach
In this section, we describe our proposed method including data collection, fea-
ture extraction and selection, and our learning method.
3.1 Data Collection
We created a navigation application named MITHRA (Multi-factor Identifica-
tion/auTHentication ReseArch) in the project of the University of Tokyo to
collect the GPS information of the users. The application can be installed on
both iOS and Android smartphones. The application was developed to be run
in the background so that the users do not feel a burden with the user interface
(UI) and that the memory consumption can be saved. The data was collected
from 348 users with 107,637 GPS records including pairs of longitude and lati-
tude for four months from January 11th to April 26th in 20172. Compared to the
2 Although the GPS was collected from smartphones in this project, GPS can com-
pletely be collected from many smaller devices such as smartwatch or smartband
nowadays
GPS-based Behavioral Authentication Using Distance Coherence 7
existing works (see Secion 2), the number of users in our dataset is higher than
most of the papers and is only lower than [10] which could collect the informa-
tion from 491 users. We recruited the participants randomly. The users live and
work in random areas. The GPS data was measured every minute. The value of
the longitudes and latitudes were collected with the precision up to 6 decimal
places (e.g., 36.xxxxxx) corresponding to 0.1 meters.
Privacy Consent The privacy consent is shown to the users during the in-
stallation process. The installation can only be done if the users accept the
terms and conditions agreement. Even after the application is successfully in-
stalled, the users can choose to start or stop using the application anytime. Any
personal information of the users such as name, age, gender, race, ethnicity, in-
come, education, etc. is not collected. Only the email address is collected as the
user identity in the collected data which is used to distinguish the users with
each other. Even though the application is used to collect the GPS information,
the users do not need to disclose which location is the home, which location is
the office, etc. Our project was reviewed by the Ethics Review Committee of
the Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, the University of
Tokyo. Finally, all the users who installed the application agreed to participate
in our project.
3.2 Feature Extraction and Selection
The features are categorized into two groups: (i) the features extracted from the
GPS and the timestamp, and (ii) the features using the distance coherence score.
GPS and Datetime There are seven features in this group. Two features
were extracted from the GPS including the latitudes and the longitudes which
are represented by float numbers. The valid ranges for the latitudes and the
longitudes are the continuous range [−90,+90] and [−180,+180], respectively.
Five features were extracted from the timestamp including month, day, hour,
minute, and day of a week (i.e., seven days from Monday to Sunday) which
are represented by integer numbers. The valid ranges for these features are the
intervals [1, 12], [1, 31], [0, 23], [0, 59], and [1, 7], respectively. The year was not
extracted as a feature because all the samples in the dataset were collected in
the same year (2017).
Distance Coherence There are α features in this group (we will soon explain
how to choose α). Every z-th feature (where z ∈ [1, α]) represents the distance
coherence (also known as similarity score) between each sample in the dataset
with the average of all the other samples in the dataset that belong to the same
user and that occur before or after p hours for every p ∈ [0, z] with the considered
sample. p = 0 is the case when the other samples occur in the same hour with
the considered sample.
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More concretely, the features are computed as follows (see Figure 1). Let
{dcz} denote the set of α features where z ∈ [1, α]. Let si denote each sample in
the dataset where i ∈ [1, n] and n denotes the number of samples (in our dataset,
n = 107, 637). For each feature dcz, let Kz = {s′j} (where j ∈ [1, n] and j 6= i)
denotes the set of all the other samples such that si and s
′
j belong to the same
user Ut (where t ∈ [1, 348]). State differently, si and s′j have the same label Ut.
Let lat(si) and lat(s
′
j), lon(si) and lon(s
′
j), and hour(si) and hour(s
′
j) denote
the latitude, the longitude, and the hour features for si and s
′
j , respectively. For
each dcz, Kz is chosen such that:
hour(si) = hour(s
′
j)± p for ∀p ∈ [1, z] (1)
The average coordinate s′′j is determined from all the samples s
′
j in Kz such as:
lat(s′′j ) = average(lat(s
′
j)) ∀s′j ∈ Kz (2)
lon(s′′j ) = average(lon(s
′
j)) ∀s′j ∈ Kz (3)
The features are finally calculated as the distance between si and s
′′
j :
dcz(si) = 2
√
(lat(si)− lat(s′′j ))2 + (lon(si)− lon(s′′j ))2 (4)
latitude
longitude 𝑠!
𝑠′" 𝑠′"
𝑠′"
𝑠′′"𝑑𝑐(𝑠!)
Fig. 1: Distance Coherence (Similarity Score)
From Equation 1, we can observe that Kz chosen for dcz is a subset of Kz′
chosen for dcz′ for all z, z
′ ∈ [1, α] such that z′ > z. It may raise the question that
whether all the α features have a correlation. However, the averages from even
correlated sets are completely different (for example, average(1, 2, 3) = 2 which is
different from average(1, 2, 3, 4) = 5). All the features dcz are thus independent
variables. A numeric example for how to calculate the distance coherence features
will be given in Appendix A.
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We now explain how the concrete value for α is. In our approach, we use three
advanced classification machine learning algorithms which are RandomForest,
ExtraTrees, and Bagging (explained in more detail in Section 3.3). We conducted
an experiment for every α from 1 and increased it gradually. We found that the
best α for RandomForest, ExtraTrees, and Bagging is 3, 4, and 5, respectively,
at which the algorithms reach a peak performance (Section 4.3). Since α reflects
the movement lifestyle of the users, it is reasonable for α to be not large. For
instance, the GPS record (a pair of latitude, longitude) of a user Ut at 15:00
may have some correlation (in terms of physical distance) with that at 14:00
and 16:00 than that at 13:00 and 17:00 or than that at 12:00 and 18:00. In the
rest of this paper, we use α-DC to denote the approach in which α distance
coherence features are used, and {lat, lon, mon, day, hour, min, weekday, dc1,
dc2, · · · , dc6} to denote the set of the thirteen features related to both the GPS
and timestamp and the distance coherence.
Feature Distribution The distribution statistics for the features is described
in Table 1 which includes the mean, standard error, median, standard deviation,
Kurtosis score, skewness score, min value, and max value. A normal distribution
check for the features is not necessary [32]. The negative and positive values in
the latitude and the longitude in the “Min” and “Max” columns indicate that
the users who used to commute in Japan might travel abroad during the time
of data collection. This kind of data can create noises during the training and
testing processes. However, we do not think it should be removed because the
data reflects the natural behavior of the users. Although the noises may lower
the accuracy, we want to measure how practical the approach is when using real
data without being manipulated.
Table 1: Feature Distribution
Feature Mean SE Median SD Kurtosis Skewness Min Max
lat 35.262 0.014 35.376 4.554 151.722 −10.935 −36.858 43.907
lon 136.783 0.034 137.846 11.165 248.09 −15.101 −121.979 174.799
month 3.321 0.002 3.000 0.753 −0.260 −0.777 1.000 4.000
day 17.328 0.026 19.000 8.600 −1.075 −0.285 1.000 31.000
hour 13.421 0.019 14.000 6.388 −0.820 −0.417 0.000 23.000
min 28.919 0.053 29.000 17.357 −1.186 0.038 0.000 59.000
weekday 3.986 0.006 4.000 1.966 −1.215 −0.016 1.000 7.000
dc1 4,104.198 137.84 191.318 45,214.683 976.703 27.756 0.000 2,545,473.711
dc2 4,359.489 137.598 239.163 45,140.323 988.797 27.801 0.000 2,548,301.562
dc3 4,586.805 140.910 259.640 46,228.488 995.124 27.895 0.000 2,549,190.471
dc4 4,678.671 140.658 272.654 46,147.07 978.139 27.653 0.004 2,554,832.383
dc5 4,781.704 141.784 276.978 46,516.486 1,002.699 28.001 0.048 2,567,773.385
dc6 4,822.694 143.361 284.604 47,033.864 1,013.685 28.284 0.017 2,568,234.888
SE (Standard Error), SD (Standard Deviation), DC: Distance Coherence
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3.3 Learning
This section explains the machine learning algorithms chosen for our model and
the evaluation method. In the dataset, each user has a different label. Each label
has a different set of records.
Average Ensemble Classifications The dataset contains 107,637 samples
with a large number of labels (348 users). Instead of using the traditional algo-
rithms, we use the advanced algorithms called average ensemble classifications
to get better performance in terms of training speed and accuracy. The average
ensemble technique builds several base estimators independently and produces
one optimal predictive estimator by averaging the predictions of all the base
estimators. The combined estimator is better than any of the single base estima-
tors by reducing the variance to control over-fitting. The most common average
ensemble algorithms are the followings:
– RandomForest [1]: This algorithm implements a meta estimator that fits a
number of decision tree classifiers on various randomized sub-samples of the
dataset and uses averaging to create the best predictive estimator. When
each estimator is built, a bootstrap is created by randomly sampling the
dataset with replacement. The size of the sub-samples is set to be the same
as the size of the original input sample. A decision tree is usually trained by
recursively splitting the data (the process to convert the non-homogeneous
parent into the two most homogeneous child nodes). The algorithm selects
an optimal split on the features selected at every node
– ExtraTrees [2]: This algorithm also produces the best predictive estimator in
a way like RandomForest. However, there are some differences. First, while
RandomForest uses the optimal split, ExtraTrees uses the random split. Sec-
ond, while RandomForest sets the bootstrap = True by default, ExtraTrees
sets the bootstrap = False by default. This also means that while Random-
Forest supports drawing sampling with replacement, ExtraTrees supports
drawing sampling without replacement.
– Bagging (Bootstrap Aggregating) [3]: This algorithm has one different point
from RandomForest and ExtraTrees. While RandomForest and ExtraTrees
select only a subset of randomized features for splitting a node, Bagging uses
all the features for splitting a node.
Stratified K-Fold The data is shuffled at first and is then used in a k-fold cross
validation. Since the numbers of samples of the users are imbalanced, using the
normal k-fold cross validation can lead to the following problem. There may
exist a class ck where k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 348} such that all the samples in its sample
set Sk belong to the test set, and the training set does not contain any of its
samples. The classifier, therefore, cannot learn about the class ck. To solve this
problem, we used Stratified k-fold cross-validation object which is a variation of
k-fold and can deal with imbalanced data in each class. As presented in Figure 2,
it splits the data in the train and the test sets and returns stratified folds that
are made by preserving the percentage of samples for each class.
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Fold 1
Fold 2
Fold 3
Fold 1
Fold 2
Fold 3
Normal KFold
Stratified KFold
Test set Train set
Fig. 2: A Stratified KFold
Evaluation Metrics To evaluate our approach, we measure the following met-
rics:
accuracy =
tp+ tn
tp+ fp+ fn+ tn
, precision =
tp
tp+ fp
, recall =
tp
tp+ fn
(5)
F1 = 2× recall × precision
recall + precision
, FPR =
fp
fp+ tn
, FNR =
fn
fn+ tp
(6)
where tp, tn, fp, fn denote the true positive, true negative, false positive, and
false negative values, respectively. FPR and FNR denote the false positive rate
and false negative rate, respectively. The accuracy is a good metric when the
distribution for each label is almost similar. However, for an imbalanced dataset,
F1-score is the better metric.
4 Experiment
This section presents the experimental setup, the results obtained after applying
the classification, and how to find the best α for each algorithm.
4.1 Experimental Setup
The program was implemented using Python 3.7.4 on a computer MacBook
Pro 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7, RAM 16 GB. The machine learning algorithms are
executed using scikit-learn3 library version 0.22.
For each ensemble algorithm, the number of base estimators n estimators is
set to 100. The k value in the stratified k-fold cross validation is set to k = 10.
Since the categorical labels are represented in text strings (such as user001,
3 https://scikit-learn.org/stable/
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user002, etc.), the labels are transformed to numerical values using the label en-
coding. Contrary to the ordinal encoding which encodes the labels to an integer
array and the one-hot encoding which encodes the labels to a one-hot numeric
array, the label encoding encodes the labels to the values between 0 and q − 1
where q is the number of distinct labels of all the classes. The label encoding
is the most lightweight method and uses less disk space. Since the data is im-
balanced, to avoid the situation that F1 is not between precision and recall,
we calculate the three metrics (precision, recall, and F1 score) for each label
and find their average weight by the number of true instances of each class.
This process can be done by setting the parameter average = weighted in the
sklearn.metrics. For the accuracy, this parameter is not necessary. Since the
values of the distance coherence features are small, we scaled them up ×104.
For each of the three algorithms (RandomForest, ExtraTrees, and Bagging), an
experiment was conducted with different α’s . The classification was applied on
107,637 samples with 348 labels which correspond to 348 users.
4.2 Main Result
The main result is presented in Table 2. In the table, NoDC represents the ap-
proach not using distance coherence features while α-DC represents the approach
using α distance coherence features. As proved later in Section 4.3, RandomFor-
est, ExtraTrees, and Bagging reach the best performance at α = 3, α = 4
and α = 5, respectively. Thus, 3-DC, 4-DC, and 5-DC are chosen to compare
with NoDC in this table (although only 1-DC can already beat NoDC (see Sec-
tion 4.3)).
The result shows that our approach α-DC outperforms NoDC in all the
cases. Comparing all the algorithms using NoDC only with each other, Bagging
gives the best result with 98.69% of F1 score with 0.02% of false negative rate.
Comparing all the algorithms using our approach with each other, RandomForest
gives the best result with 99.42% of F1 score and merely 0.01% of false negative
rate even though RandomForest just reaches α at α = 3 (which is less than α = 4
for ExtraTrees and α = 5 for Bagging). Comparing the improvement between
α-DC and NoDC, ExtraTrees gives the best result when 2.34% of F1 score is
increased (4 = +2.34) and 0.04% of false negative rate is reduced (4 = −0.04).
4.3 Best Alpha (α) for Each Algorithm
This section explains the experiment to find the best α for each algorithm. First,
α is set to 1 and is then gradually increased until the performance becomes
convergent or is reduced after reaching the peak. The result and its graphs are
presented in Table 3 and Figure 3. The proposed approach using RandomForest,
ExtraTrees, and Bagging got the best performance at α = 3, α = 4, and α = 5,
respectively. Figure 3 shows that in all the algorithms, the graph almost has the
cone shape (the result is gradually increased, gets the peak, and then is reduced
or becomes convergent), not a zigzag shape (in which we cannot predict where
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Table 2: Result for Distance Coherent with Different Ensemble Algorithms
Measure
RandomForest ExtraTrees Bagging
NoDC 3-DC 4 NoDC 4-DC 4 NoDC 5-DC 4
F1 97.95 99.42 +1.47 96.77 99.11 +2.34 98.69 99.24 +0.55
Accuracy 97.97 99.42 +1.45 96.80 99.12 +2.32 98.69 99.25 +0.56
Precision 98.05 99.45 +1.40 96.90 99.15 +2.25 98.75 99.28 +0.53
Recall 97.97 99.42 +1.45 96.80 99.12 +2.32 98.69 99.25 +0.56
FPR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FNR 0.03 0.01 −0.02 0.05 0.01 −0.04 0.02 0.01 −0.01
NoDC: the approach without distance coherence features,
α-DC (α = 3, 4, 5): the approach using distance coherence features,
4: the improved score between α-DC and NoDC.
is the peak). The result also shows that by even just using 1-DC (α = 1), our
approach can already beat NoDC.
Table 3: Result for Each Alpha
1-DC 2-DC 3-DC 4-DC 5-DC 6-DC
RandomForest
F1 99.11 99.41 99.42 99.38 99.36 99.31
Accuracy 99.11 99.42 99.42 99.38 99.37 99.31
Precision 99.15 99.44 99.45 99.41 99.39 99.35
Recall 99.11 99.42 99.42 99.38 99.37 99.31
FPR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FNR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ExtraTrees
F1 97.27 98.90 98.98 99.11 99.11 99.11
Accuracy 97.30 98.91 98.99 99.12 99.12 99.11
Precision 97.40 98.95 99.03 99.15 99.15 99.15
Recall 97.30 98.91 98.99 99.12 99.12 99.11
FPR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FNR 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Bagging
F1 99.03 99.07 99.10 99.14 99.24 99.23
Accuracy 99.04 99.07 99.10. 99.14 99.25 99.23
Precision 99.07 99.11 99.14 99.18 99.28 99.26
Recall 99.04 99.07 99.10 99.14 99.25 99.23
FPR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FNR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
4.4 Computation Time
For the best algorithms (5-DC using Bagging, 4-DC using ExtraTrees, and 3-
DC using RandomForest), the average computational time for the training and
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Fig. 3: Different Alpha’s for Distance Coherence
cross validation processes from 5 execution times is 2,272 seconds (38 minutes),
merely 270 seconds (4.5 minutes), and 596 seconds (10 minutes) respectively.
It is not a big deal for the server. When the number of users is much more
increased (e.g., to thousands), it is not complicated to transform the current
model from the one-class classification to a multi-class classification where each
user has a different classifier with binary labels representing whether or not a
sample belongs to that user.
5 Threat Model
In this section, we present the threat model including which attack is focused
on, the adversary’s probability, and the assumptions.
5.1 Targeted Attack
Most of such authentication systems, not just our approach but other previous
biometrics-based authentication, focus on protecting against insider threats in
which the adversary tries to impersonate the authentication of an authorized
user in the system. As mentioned in Section 1, at this time the behavioral-
based authentication should be used as an additional approach to support the
GPS-based Behavioral Authentication Using Distance Coherence 15
conventional PIN code, password, or biometric authentications. So let’s run an
example in which our approach is combined with PIN code-based authentication.
Let PrA denote the probability that the adversary A can break the system. PrA
is defined as:
PrA = Prguess · Prforge (7)
where Prguess and Prforge denote the probability that A can correctly guess the
PIN code and the average probability that A can fool the classifier, respectively.
Prforge is the false negative rate which is the percentage of identification in-
stances in which the unauthorized users are incorrectly accepted. Table 2 shows
that all the 3-DC, 4-DC, and 5-DC approaches corresponding to the three differ-
ent algorithms have the same 0.01% of false negative rate. Thus, Prforge = 10
−4.
Let τ and σ denote the number of digits in the PIN code and the number of
guessing candidates for each PIN code digit. If A has nt tries before the device
is locked with many wrong PIN codes, we have Prguess =
nt
στ . Finally, PrA is
thus:
PrA = 10−4 · nt
στ
(8)
Most of the new smartphone operation systems nowadays require 6 digits for
PIN code. Typically, there are 10 digits of candidates from 0 to 9 for each digit.
The users often have 4 to 6 PIN code tries for both Android and iOS before the
device is locked. Therefore, PrA ' 4 · 10−10 to 6 · 10−10.
Suppose the attacker can guess the PIN code after shoulder surfing and then
robs the smartphone of the user. Since the application is designed such that every
GPS record is sent to the server in realtime and the GPS history is not stored in
the user smartphone, the attacker cannot see the log from the robbed phone to
imitate the user’s behavior. Also, there is no function of downloading the GPS
log from the server to the smartphone because it is a doubtable action from a
(suspicious) user. The only action that the attacker can manipulate on the GPS
tracking application is to turn it on/off or uninstall it. If the attacker continues
to use the smartphone (without the ability to search for the history log from
the smartphone application), the probability for the attacker PrA is now 0.01%.
Even though it is not 0% for the best case, it is still much better than 100% for
A to break the system without our approach. Similarly, if the collusion attack in
which an authorized user shares his/her PIN code to others occurs, PrA is also
0.01%. If the colluded user tells others his/her personal location history, it is
unlikely for every single continuous GPS record to be imitated. This is why the
idea of using behaviors (especially, long-term and continuous) is investigated.
The model is assumed that the server storing the GPS cannot be accessed or
corrupted by the adversary. The data is encrypted and only the trusted server
can decrypt it. The data is transmitted via a secure network. Each smartphone is
used by only a unique user. The smartphone and the server are protected against
the side-channel attack which can collect the user data via timing information,
power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, or sound. Last but not least, the
users are assumed to be honest in sending their own data to the server where
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the classifier is performed because the data may be actively manipulated by an
adversary seeking to make the classifier produce false negatives [29].
5.2 Security Scenario Discussion
In this section, we discuss other security scenarios from using smartphones.
What if two users live and work in the same areas? As mentioned in
Section 3.1, since our project recruited the users randomly, the users live and
work in random areas. Even if there is a very rare case when two users live and
work in the same area, they cannot have the same GPS tracking for every single
hour because each user has many different activities at different timestamp not
just at home and office (such as shopping, outdoor exercising, picking children
at schools, etc.). Furthermore, inside the home and the office building, indoor
positioning can be collected besides the GPS such as WiFi or Bluetooth beacons.
Since the goal in this paper is to investigate the benefit of the extra informa-
tion (i.e., the distance coherence) from the GPS itself, we do not consider to
collect indoor location information; however, it is completely possible since the
GPS and the indoor location information can be collected independently. Let’s
consider the case when legal users have the same trajectory within a period of
time (e.g., elderly people in a senior home have daily activities confined to the
surroundings). Since the longitude and latitude values have 6 decimal places (see
Section 3.1), the precision is 0.1 meters. With this precision, two users cannot
have the same movement log in a long period.
How does the system work when individuals are outside their routine
or when the attacker follows (imitates) the users behavior? Since these
questions are not just for the GPS-based location authentication but the general
behavioral-based authentication, we discuss from the general to specific perspec-
tives. We want to emphasize that a single-factor behavioral-based authentication
is used to support (not to replace) the conventional approaches such as password
or biometrics; or it is combined with other behavioral factors to build up a multi-
factor behavioral-based authentication. If a user is outside his/her routine or the
attacker tries to imitate the user’s behavior, the password/biometric or other rou-
tines are used to lower the false rejection and false acceptance rates. Although
behavioral-based authentication has not yet been commonly used, this new but
promising research has been proved to be possible for real applications. For in-
stance, Google has launched the Project Abacus [34] just since 2016 to collect
smartphone sensor signals (i.e., front-facing camera, touchscreen and keyboard,
gyroscope, accelerometer, magnetometer, ambient light sensor, etc) and demon-
strated that human kinematics can convey important information about user
identity and can serve as a valuable component of multi-modal authentication
systems. Among many behaviors, location is a typical factor to identify users.
Human beings are creatures of habit, and in as much as location is a measure of
habit [5]. Also, the location is easy to collect since it is available in most modern
smartphones.
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Is it a problem when a user gets a new phone? It has no problem since
the smartphone is just the device/tool, not the method. The user can register
a location-based authentication system with an account and its application in-
stalled in his smartphones. As long as the user does not share his account to
others and as long as the application is designed such that at a specific times-
tamp, an account can only be logged in a smartphone, his unique GPS data
can be collected regardless of how many smartphones are used and regardless of
whether the user shares his smartphones to others.
6 Future Work
This section, we describe an idea for future work based on the separation of
daily and weekly distance coherences. In our current approach, for each sample
si, the distance coherence features are calculated by grouping the other samples
which have the corresponding clock hours close to the clock hour of si regardless
of the dates. We thus call it daily distance coherence. An example is given in
the first chart of Figure 4. The features chosen for the sample si which has the
timestamp at 7:00 April 10, 2020 (Friday) are calculated using the samples at
7:00±α on any date as long as they belong to the same user.
𝑠!: 7:00 April 10 (Fri) 2020
DC: 7:00±𝛼 Regardless of date 𝑠!: 7:00 April 10 (Fri), 2020DC: 7:00±𝛼 April 03 (Fri), 2020
DC: 7:00±𝛼 April 17 (Fri), 2020
…  => Same weekday (Fri)
Weekly Distance ConherenceDaily Distance Conherence
𝑠! 7:00 April 09 
(Thu), 2020
(𝛼=0)
8:00 April 11 
(Sat), 2020 
(𝛼=1)
9:00 April 
08 (Wed), 
2020 (𝛼=2)
6:00 April 
08 (Wed), 
2020 (𝛼=1)
𝑠! 7:00 April 03 
(Fri), 2020
(𝛼=0)
8:00 April 17 
(Fri), 2020 
(𝛼=1)
9:00 April 
03 (Fri), 
2020 (𝛼=2)
6:00 April 
17 (Fri), 
2020 (𝛼=1)
Fig. 4: Daily and Weekly Distance Coherence
However, another promising method may improve the accuracy or F1 score.
For each sample si, the distance coherence features are calculated by grouping
the other samples which have the clock hours close to the clock hour of si on only
the days that have the same day of the week. We thus call it weekly distance
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coherence. Look at the example in the second chart of Figure 4, suppose si
occurred at 7:00 April 10, 2020 (Friday), the featured chosen for si are calculated
from the samples at 7:00±α on every day of Friday such as April 03, 2020 or
April 17, 2020, etc. These features may reflect the lifestyle of the users that we
are aiming for in this paper. For example, a worker goes to work every weekday
but goes to the usual supermarket every Saturday around 10:00, a student has
a training course at a usual stadium every Thursday around 15:00. These habits
can be measured by the weekly distance coherence. Remark that, the weekly
distance coherence features are not covered in the daily ones. Each feature is
computed from the average of all the samples chosen for the main sample. Even
though the set of the samples chosen for the weekly case is a subset of the set
of that in the daily case, their averages are different.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that using the distance coherence score as the
additional features can improve user authentication. We collected 107,637 GPS
records including longitude, latitude, and timestamp from 348 users in Japan.
The three average ensemble algorithms including RandomForest, ExtraTrees,
and Bagging are applied to the classification and are evaluated using stratified
k-fold. The experimental result showed that our approach outperforms the ap-
proach without the distance coherence in all the cases. The accuracy can reach
up to 99.42%, 99.12%, and 99.25% using RandomForest, ExtraTrees, and Bag-
ging, respectively. Especially, the F1 score can be improved even 2.34% and the
false negative rate can be reduced 0.04% using ExtraTrees.
Appendix
A Numeric Example (for Distance Coherence Extraction)
In this section, we give a numeric example for the distance coherence extraction
in Section 3.2. Suppose the data consists of 7 samples {s1, s2, · · · , s7} from 2
users {user1, user2} as showed in Table 4. We explain how to calculate the
distance coherence for each sample {dc11, dc12, dc13, dc21, dc22, dc23, dc24}.
Suppose α (the number of distance coherence feature) is set to α = 1.
– For s1, the hour extracted from the timestamp is hour(s1) = 10. We find all
the samples si that belong to the same class (user1) and have hour(si) such
that (hour(s1)− α) ≤ hour(si) ≤ (hour(s1) + α) regardless of the date and
the second. Only s2 satisfies the conditions (i.e., hour(s2) = 11). Thus:
dc11 =
2
√
(lon11 − lon12)2 + (lat11 − lat12)2 (9)
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Table 4: Numeric Example for Calculating Distance Coherence
SampleID User/Class Timestamp Longitude Latitude Distance Coherence
1 user1 2020/01/16 10:55 lon11 lat11 dc11
2 user1 2020/01/17 11:55 lon12 lat12 dc12
3 user1 2020/01/17 12:50 lon13 lat13 dc13
4 user2 2020/01/16 21:30 lon21 lat21 dc21
5 user2 2020/01/17 22:10 lon22 lat22 dc22
6 user2 2020/01/18 21:45 lon23 lat23 dc23
7 user2 2020/01/19 20:10 lon24 lat24 dc25
– For s2, hour(s2) = 11. The samples si from user1 that satisfy (hour(s2) −
α) ≤ hour(si) ≤ (hour(s2)+α) consist of s1 and s3 (hour(s1) = 10, hour(s3) =
12). Thus:
dc12 =
2
√
(lon12 − lon11 + lon13
2
)2 + (lat12 − lat11 + lat13
2
)2 (10)
– For s3, hour(s3) = 12. The sample si from user1 that satisfies (hour(s3)−
α) ≤ hour(si) ≤ hour(s3) + α) is only s2 (hour(s2) = 11). Thus:
dc13 =
2
√
(lon13 − lon12)2 + (lat13 − lat12)2 (11)
– For s4, hour(s4) = 21. The samples si from user2 that satisfy (hour(s4) −
α) ≤ hour(si) ≤ (hour(s4) +α) is s5, s6, and s7 (hour(s5) = 22, hour(s6) =
21, hour(s7) = 20). Thus:
dc21 =
2
√
(lon21 − lon22 + lon23 + lon24
3
)2 + (lat21 − lat22 + lat23 + lat24
3
)2
(12)
– For s5, hour(s5) = 22. The samples si from user2 that satisfy (hour(s5) −
α) ≤ hour(si) ≤ (hour(s5) + α) is s4 and s6 (hour(s4) = hour(s6) = 21).
Thus:
dc22 =
2
√
(lon22 − lon21 + lon23
2
)2 + (lat22 − lat21 + lat23
2
)2 (13)
– For s6, hour(s6) = 21. The samples si from user2 that satisfy (hour(s6) −
α) ≤ hour(si) ≤ (hour(s6) +α) is s4, s5, and s7 (hour(s4) = 21, hour(s5) =
22, hour(s7) = 20). Thus:
dc23 =
2
√
(lon23 − lon21 + lon22 + lon24
3
)2 + (lat23 − lat21 + lat22 + lat24
3
)2
(14)
– For s7, hour(s7) = 20. The samples si from user2 that satisfy (hour(s7) −
α) ≤ hour(si) ≤ (hour(s7) + α) is s4 and s6 (hour(s4) = hour(s6) = 21).
Thus:
dc24 =
2
√
(lon24 − lon21 + lon23
2
)2 + (lat24 − lat21 + lat23
2
)2 (15)
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